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Abstract
A well-known difficulty in survey research is that respondents’ answers to ques-
tions can depend on arbitrary features of a survey’s design, such as the wording
of questions or the ordering of answer choices. In this paper we describe a novel
set of tools for analyzing survey data characterized by such framing effects. We
show that the conventional approach to analyzing data with framing effects – ran-
domizing survey-takers across frames and pooling the responses – generally does
not identify a useful parameter. In its place, we propose an alternative approach
and provide conditions under which it identifies the responses that are unaffected
by framing. We also present several results for shedding light on the population
distribution of the individual characteristic the survey is designed to measure.
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Slemrod, Martin Wells, Justin Wolfers, and participants in seminars at the University of Michigan,
Princeton University, and the Junior Empirical Legal Studies workshop at Cornell Law School. All
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Introduction
A well-known difficulty in survey research is that how survey-takers respond to a ques-
tion may depend on seemingly arbitrary details about how the question is asked. For ex-
ample, respondents may answer differently depending on the order of questions (Moore,
2002; Deaton, 2012), the order in which answer choices are listed (Holbrook et al., 2007),
the grouping of responses into categories (Schwarz, 1990), or any number of minor vari-
ations in the manner in which questions or responses are worded (Schuman and Presser,
1981; Chong and Druckman, 2007). Such framing effects arise in many contexts; large
literatures in psychology, political science, communications, and marketing are devoted
to documenting and explaining their presence.
Despite the attention paid to framing effects in recent decades, the range of practical
solutions available to survey researchers remains limited. The conventional wisdom is
that when framing effects are unavoidable, researchers should balance them by randomly
assigning an equal number of survey-takers to each version of the survey questionnaire
and then analyze the pooled responses.1 Some researchers acknowledge problems with
this approach but note the lack of better alternatives (e.g., Schwarz and Oyserman,
2001).
In this paper we present a simple empirical approach for the analysis of survey data
characterized by framing effects.2 Our results highlight important shortcomings with
the conventional pooling approach. In its place, we propose several alternatives and
argue they are more likely to shed light on questions of interest to the researcher.
Our formal analysis focuses on binary-response questions in which an arbitrary
feature of the survey – the frame – affects the responses of a subset of survey-takers.
We assume that each respondent is observed answering a given survey question only
once, under one of two possible frames. We label respondents as consistent if they would
1The following statements are typical of the literature: “Randomization ... does not reduce the
impact of context at the level of individual respondents. It simply ensures that these influences result
in random noise rather than systematic bias in the sample as a whole.” (Sudman, Bradburn and
Schwarz, 1995). “Our findings suggest that survey organizations should routinely rotate the order of
response choices to guard against creating bias in results.” (Holbrook et al., 2007). “Acquiescence bias
can be reduced by balancing scales so that the affirming response half the time is in the direction of
the construct and half the time is in the opposite direction (e.g. six agree/disagree items on national
pride, with the patriotic response matching three agree and three disagree responses).” (Presser et al.,
2004).
2In other work, we derive analogous results to study the identification of decision-makers’ preferences
in settings characterized by inconsistent choice data (Goldin and Reck, 2015). The goal of the current
paper is to apply this approach to survey data in which framing effects are present and to use these
results to assess the conventional approach for dealing with framing effects in survey research.
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select the same response under both frames and inconsistent if their response would vary
depending on the frame under which the question is asked. This potential outcomes
framework has been widely applied in causal inference analysis (e.g., Holland, 1986;
Imbens and Angrist, 1994). In contrast to that literature, our goal is not to estimate
the effect of the treatment (i.e., the frame) on a variable but rather to recover the
distribution of a variable after removing the treatment’s effect.
Considering the problem from this light, we show that the pooling approach does
not itself eliminate the bias induced by framing effects. Rather, that approach yields
a response share that is a weighted sum of (1) the response share of the consistent
respondents, and (2) the fraction of respondents assigned to each frame, typically 0.5,
where the weights depend on the fraction of respondents that are affected by the frame.
Outside a narrow set of applications, this weighted sum is unlikely to be the parameter
of interest to the researcher. In its place, we propose several alternatives and describe
the conditions under which they are valid.
First, we consider identification of the consistent response share – the response share
for the subset of respondents who are unaffected by the frame. Consistent responses
are most likely to be of primary interest to the researcher in settings where the sur-
vey is designed to measure some attitude or belief and where frame-varying responses
indicate an incoherent or unformed opinion about the question being asked. For exam-
ple, a researcher conducting an opinion survey may wish to exclude the responses of
a survey-taker who simply states that she prefers whichever answer is presented first.
We show that under the assumption that the frame affects respondents in a uniform
direction, an assumption we label frame monotonicity, it is straightforward to estimate
the consistent response share from the data. Intuitively, only consistent respondents
ever select an answer that is “against the frame” – for example, choosing the second op-
tion when the answer order favors the first option. Consequently, examining the share
of respondents who respond against the frame sheds light on the share of consistent
respondents selecting each response.
The plausibility of frame monotonicity varies by setting. When the assumption
fails, the consistent response share is only partially identified. Importantly, however,
we show that when frame monotonicity is assumed erroneously, the approach we propose
for identifying the consistent response share will be biased, but will be less biased than
the conventional pooling approach.
In other applications, even the respondents who answer inconsistently will have
well-defined (but unobservable) answers to the question being asked that the researcher
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hopes to recover. Plainly, in at least some cases, such as when the researcher is seeking
to learn about respondents’ past behavior, a “true” answer to the survey question
exists for even those individuals whose responses depend on the frame. For example,
suppose a researcher samples respondents from a population and asks them how much
television they watch per week, but that the wording of the answer choices affects
responses (Schwarz, 1990). If the goal of the survey is to learn the television habits of
the population, the researcher will be interested in the behavior of both the consistent
and inconsistent respondents.
We provide additional results for applications like this – where the goal is to recover
the distribution of a characteristic among all respondents (consistent and inconsistent
alike). First, we describe worst-case bounds for this parameter. Second, we describe a
new re-weighting technique that exploits respondents’ observable covariates to extrapo-
late from the consistent respondents to the full population. Intuitively, the answers for
the inconsistent respondents are treated as missing data, which can be imputed using
the answers of the consistent respondents with similar observable covariates.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes our basic as-
sumptions and provides notation to study framing effects. Section II analyzes the
conventional pooling approach from this perspective and highlights its shortcomings.
Section III derives results for estimating the consistent response share. Section IV
provides results for identifying demographic characteristics of the consistent and in-
consistent respondents. Section V considers settings in which even the inconsistent
respondents are assumed to have some value of the variable of interest to the survey
researcher. Section VI provides an extended illustration of our proposed approach.
Section VII concludes.
I. Model and Notation
Consider a set of individuals, denoted by i. Each individual answers a binary ques-
tion, with response indicated by yi ∈ {0, 1}. Many survey questions have this binary
form. For example, yi might denote whether one agrees with a particular statement or
supports a particular candidate for office.
The purpose of the survey question is to elicit information about some individual
characteristic, which we refer to as the characteristic of interest, y∗i . For each individual,
y∗i is either 0, 1, or undefined. For example, if a survey question asks whether a
respondent believes a particular statement to be true, y∗i would indicate whether or
4
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not the respondent actually believes the statement in question. In the case that the
respondent lacks a belief about the statement, y∗i would be undefined.
Each individual answers the survey question once, under one of two possible frames.
Let di denote the frame to which individual i is assigned, di ∈ {d0, d1}. Let yi(d)
denote how i would answer if asked the survey question under frame d. That is, yi(d) =
yi when di = d. A framing effect occurs when a change in the presentation of a
question is associated with a change in at least some respondents’ answers, and where
that change in presentation is, by assumption, unrelated to the information the survey
researcher seeks to measure. More abstractly, a survey question is designed to elicit
information about a characteristic of a respondent (y∗i ), and the defining feature of
a frame is that the characteristic of interest does not depend on the frame, i.e., y∗i
does not depend on d. For example, a researcher seeking to learn whether an individual
supports a proposed policy would typically hope to measure an attitude that is unrelated
to whether the survey question is phrased positively or negatively, and to the order in
which the answer choices are presented. Similarly, the presence of interviewer effects
– in which interviewer characteristics affect respondents’ answers – or survey method
effects – such as differences in the answers of respondents taking the survey in-person
versus online – will typically satisfy the definition of a frame. This definition of a frame
is similar to the definition proposed by Salant and Rubinstein (2008).
Let ci ∈ {0, 1} indicate whether an individual’s response would be consistent across
frames: ci ≡ 1{yi(d0) = yi(d1)}. The fraction of respondents affected by the frame is
given by P (ci = 0) = 1 − E[ci]. Let Y0 denote the mean response among individuals
observed under frame d0, Y0 = E[yi|di = d0], and let Y1 = E[yi|di = d1].
Throughout the paper, we assume that population moments such as Y0 and Y1
are directly observable to the researcher, setting aside issues of sampling error. This
simplifying assumption allows us to abstract from issues of statistical inference. In
practice, researchers wishing to apply our results would replace population moments
with their finite-sample analogues. For example, one would replace Y0 with the mean
response observed among survey-takers in d0 and Y1 with the mean response observed
among survey-takers in d1. It is straightforward to calculate the associated standard
errors for these estimates using the delta method (see Supplementary Appendix B for
derivations). Section VI illustrates how one would apply our results to observed survey
data exhibiting framing effects.
Finally, we assume that framing effects are observed, so Y0 6= Y1. Without loss of
generality, we assume Y1 > Y0.
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Examples
The above notation accommodates a number of types of survey questions and framing
effects. We provide several examples here.
Answer Order In a Gallup Organization (2003) telephone poll on opinions concerning
the Iraq war, certain respondents were asked the following question:
Do you think the Bush administration (1) Provided information about
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction that was accurate, or (2) Provided
information about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction it thought was
accurate, but turned out to be inaccurate?
The order of answers (1) and (2) was reversed for half of the respondents. The
response share was observed to vary depending on which answer choice was pre-
sented first. When (1) was presented first, 51% of respondents reported believing
that the Bush administration provided accurate information. When (2) was pre-
sented first, only 41% reported believing this statement.
Question Order Moore (2002) documents question-order effects in a 1997 Gallup
survey. Respondents were asked the following question about both Bill Clinton
and Al Gore:
Do you generally think Bill Clinton [Al Gore] is honest and trustworthy?
Respondents’ answers varied depending on which politician was asked about first.
When the Clinton question was asked first, 50% of respondents reported thinking
Clinton was trustworthy, whereas 57% reported thinking so when the Gore ques-
tion was asked first. Conversely, 68% reported thinking Gore to be trustworthy
when the Gore question was asked first, but only 60% did so when the Clinton
question was first.
Question Wording (Acquiescence Bias) Schuman and Presser (1981) document
the presence of numerous survey framing effects, including one that they refer to
as “acquiescence bias” – the tendency of respondents to agree with the question
being asked, regardless of the content. In one of their studies, individuals were
randomly assigned to one of two versions of the same question. The fraction
agreeing with the stated proposition is provided in brackets.
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Individuals are more to blame than social conditions for crime and
lawlessness in this country [60%]
Social conditions are more to blame than individuals for crime and
lawlessness in this country [57%]
Question Wording (Gain/Loss Framing) Tversky and Kahneman (1981) asked ex-
perimental participants about their willingness to accept risky policies that have
the potential to save large numbers of lives. Respondents were asked two versions
of a question after being randomly divided into the gain frame and the loss frame:
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian
disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs
to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact
scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs are as follows:
[Gain Frame] If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If
Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be
saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved. Which of the
two programs would you favor? [Program A: 72%, Program B: 28%]
[Loss Frame] If Program C is adopted 400 people will die. If Program
D is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3
probability that 600 people will die.Which of the two programs would
you favor? [Program C: 22%, Program D: 78%]
Note that Programs A and C are identical, as are Programs B and D.
These examples illustrate the range of framing effects that have been documented in
survey research. In many cases, framing effects are difficult to avoid: questions and
responses must be provided to respondents in some order, and they must be worded
in some way. The remainder of the paper investigates possible approaches for dealing
with framing effects when they arise.
II. The Conventional Pooling Approach
As described above, the conventional approach to analyzing survey data that exhibit
framing effects is to randomize respondents evenly across frames and then to proceed
using the responses pooled across the frames. For example, political polling surveys,
recognizing the potential for response-order effects, typically rotate which major candi-
date is listed first and which is listed second; however, after this initial randomization,
candidate order usually plays no further role in the analysis. This section shows that,
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contrary to the conventional wisdom, simply randomizing survey-takers across frames
and pooling the responses does not eliminate the bias associated with framing effects.
Suppose that respondents are randomly assigned to each frame, with equal proba-
bility of being selected for each. The pooled response share, Yp, is defined as:
Yp ≡ Y1 + Y02
We will assume that the frame to which an individual is assigned is unrelated to
how the individual would respond under either frame:
Assumption 1 (Frame Exogeneity) Frame assignment di is independent of the vec-
tor (yi(d0), yi(d1)).
This assumption is satisfied, for example, if respondents are randomly assigned across
frames.
We next assume that but for the observed framing effect, survey responses accurately
reflect the characteristic of interest:
Assumption 2 (Consistent Responses Reflect the Characteristic of Interest)
For each i, ci = 1 =⇒ yi = y∗i .
Assumption 2 implies that the answers to the survey question obtained from the con-
sistent respondents – those whose answers are unaffected by the frame – reflect the
characteristic of interest for members of that group. In addition, the assumption im-
plies that if a respondent is consistent, then y∗i is defined.3 The assumption repre-
sents a weakening of the baseline assumption typically made in survey analysis, namely
that every respondent’s answer corresponds to the characteristic of interest – i.e. that
yi = y∗i always. In practice, of course, survey responses may fail to accurately reflect
the characteristic of interest for a number of reasons apart from framing effects, such as
forgetfulness, deception, or inattentiveness by the survey-taker. We restrict our analysis
here to errors caused by framing effects to focus on the key features of our approach.
Finally, Assumption 2 implicitly defines the types of framing effects to which our
approach is meant to be applied: those in which framing effects are a “nuisance,” and
prevent the researcher from recovering the characteristic of interest from the observed
survey responses. In other settings, framing effects can actually be desirable, such as
3We consider the question of whether y∗i is defined for inconsistent respondents in Section V, below.
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when a researcher employs the Random-Response-Technique (RRT) to obtain higher-
quality responses to sensitive questions (Jann, Jerke and Krumpal, 2011; Wolter and
Preisendo¨rfer, 2013). In practice, virtually all instances in which the pooling approach
is applied are cases in which framing effects are viewed as undesirable.
A useful quantity for understanding the pooling approach is the response share
among consistent respondents, E[yi|ci = 1]. Under Assumption 2, this parameter is
equal to the mean of the characteristic of interest among the consistent respondents,
which we denote by pic. Formally, pic = E[y∗i |ci = 1] = E[yi|ci = 1]. Although the
consistent response share cannot be directly observed from the data, the following
proposition provides conditions under which it can be identified.
Proposition 1: The Pooled Response Share
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the pooled response share identifies the following weighted
sum: Yp = E[ci]pic + (1− E[ci])
(
1
2
)
.
Proof By the law of iterated expectations
Y0 = E[yi(d0)|ci = 1, di = d0]P (ci = 1|di = d0)+E[yi(d0)|ci = 0, di = d0]P (ci = 0|di = d0).
Applying Assumption 1 yields
Y0 = E[yi(d0)|ci = 1]P (ci = 1) + E[yi(d0)|ci = 0]P (ci = 0).
Under Assumption 2, yi(d0) = yi(d1) = y∗i when ci = 1. Hence we can use the definition
of pic to write
Y0 = pic P (ci = 1) + E[yi(d0)|ci = 0]P (ci = 0). (1)
Similarly, one can show that
Y1 = pic P (ci = 1) + E[yi(d1)|ci = 0]P (ci = 0). (2)
Finally, note that when ci = 0, (yi(d0), yi(d1)) ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 0)}, and thus yi(d0) +
yi(d1) = 1 ∀i. Hence,
E[yi(d0)|ci = 0] + E[yi(d1)|ci = 0] = 1. (3)
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Substituting (1) and (2) into the definition of Yp and applying (3) yields the desired
result. 
When survey respondents are evenly divided between frames, Proposition 1 shows
that the pooled response share is a weighted average of the consistent response share
and 0.5.4 To understand the intuition, consider two extreme examples. First suppose
that all respondents are consistent, so E[ci] = 1. In that case the pooled response
share would yield the share of the population that (consistently) selects yi = 1, Yp =
pic = E[yi] = E[y∗i ]. Next, consider the opposite extreme, in which all respondents are
sensitive to the frame, so that E[ci] = 0. In that case, assigning half of the respondents
to d0 and half to d1 would result in half of the respondents selecting each answer,
yielding Yp = 0.5. Finally, when there are both consistent and inconsistent respondents
in the population, the pooled response share will simply be the weighted average of
these two extremes, where the weights depend on the fraction of respondents in each
group.
Proposition 1 has a straightforward interpretation without Assumption 2. The
proposition still holds as stated, but with pic redefined as E[yi|ci = 1]. That is, the
pooled response share is still a weighted sum of the consistent response share and 0.5,
but the consistent response share is not necessarily informative about the consistent
respondents’ characteristic of interest, y∗i . Thus, the violation of Assumption 2 would
not typically support the use of the pooling approach – it just makes it more difficult
to interpret the parameter that approach identifies.
We can think of few practical settings in which a researcher would want to iden-
tify the parameter identified by the pooled response share. In particular, the pooled
response share will depend on the magnitude of the framing effect. For example, a
pooled response share close to 0.5 could indicate either that many respondents are af-
fected by the frame or that an equal number of respondents would consistently select
each of the available answer options.5 In the next sections, we describe alternative
approaches for dealing with framing effects in survey analysis.
4Typically the pooling approach is implemented using equal assignment to both frames. Under
frame monotonicity (Assumption 3, below), one can show that assigning some arbitrary fraction θ to
d1 and the rest to d0 implies Yp = E[ci]pic + (1− E[ci])θ.
5One narrow set of cases in which the pooled response share does identify a useful parameter is
when the goal of a survey is to predict a future choice that is characterized by the same framing effect
as the survey itself. For example, suppose election polling data exhibits candidate order effects. If
actual voting behavior will exhibit the same candidate order effects as the survey, and if the order of
candidate names on the actual ballot will itself be randomized, then the pooled response share will
estimate the weighted average associated with the actual election results.
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III. Identifying the Consistent Response Share
This section considers how researchers might attempt to recover information about pic
– the response share for the subset of survey-takers whose responses are consistent
across frames. In contrast to the parameter identified by Yp, pic may reflect information
that is of primary interest to the researcher. First, pic provides information about the
quantity the survey was designed to measure, y∗i , in a way that is not mechanically
related to the frame in which respondents are observed. Additionally, in the context of
survey questions designed to measure respondents’ attitudes or beliefs, for example, the
inconsistent respondents may lack a meaningful opinion about the question being asked,
so that y∗i is undefined. In such cases, researchers may wish to isolate the responses
of the consistent individuals from the responses of those whose answers depend on the
frame. Conversely, in situations in which the researcher assumes that all inconsistent
respondents do have a well-defined y∗i , such as questions about past behavior, one may
wish to extrapolate from the consistent responses to recover the characteristic of interest
for the inconsistent respondents. Identifying pic is the first step in solving this problem,
the remainder of which is considered in Section V.
Identifying pic would be trivial if the researcher could observe individual respondents
under both frames; the inconsistent respondents could be individually identified and
their responses discarded.6 In contrast, when each respondent is only observed under
one frame, the degree to which pic can be identified depends on whether the frame
in question affects all respondents in a uniform direction. In particular, consider the
following assumption:
Assumption 3 (Frame Monotonicity) For each i, yi(d1) ≥ yi(d0).
For example, if one observes that a higher fraction of respondents answer “Yes” when
asked version A of a question as compared to version B, frame monotonicity implies that
there are no respondents who answer “No” to version A but “Yes” to version B. Clearly
this assumption will be more plausible in some settings, such as with default effects
(where it is difficult to imagine that a non-trivial number of respondents always select
6We assume that choices are observable in just one frame because the vast majority of data on
framing effects are collected using between-subjects designs, especially in recent years. This tendency
stems from concerns that, when respondents are asked the same question under multiple frames, the
order in which respondents answer questions from multiple frames can affect the responses (LeBoeuf
and Shafir, 2003), or that respondents might guess the hypothesis under study (Tversky and Kahneman,
1983). There has nevertheless been some debate among psychologists about the use of within- versus
between-subject designs in the study of judgment, and some studies on framing effects do use within-
subjects designs (see Lambdin and Shaffer, 2009 for a review).
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whichever response is not marked as the default), and less likely to hold in other settings,
such as with response-order effects (where one might imagine that some respondents
always select the first option while others always select the most recent option). The
following proposition describes the role of frame monotonicity in identifying pic.
Proposition 2: The Consistent Response Share
Let Yc = Y0Y0+1−Y1 , and maintain Assumptions 1 and 2.
2.1 Under frame monotonicity, E[ci] = Y0 + 1− Y1 and Yc = pic.
2.2 Without frame monotonicity, E[ci] and pic are bounded as follows:
2.2.1 |1− Y1 − Y0| ≤ E[ci] ≤ Y0 + 1− Y1, and
2.2.2 Yc ≤ 12 =⇒ pic ∈ [0, Yc] and Yc ≥ 12 =⇒ pic ∈ [Yc, 1]
Proof of 2.1 Applying frame monotonicity to (1) and (2) yields Y0 = picE[ci]
and Y1 = picE[ci] + 1 − E[ci], so that Y0 + 1 − Y1 = E[ci]. Substituting these into the
definition of Yc yields the result. 
The proof of Proposition 2.2, and of all further results, is contained in the supple-
mentary appendix.
Proposition 2.1 establishes that the consistent response share is point-identified
when frame monotonicity holds. Intuitively, frame monotonicity implies that only con-
sistent individuals respond against the frame, so that any respondent selecting yi = 1
under d0 would also select yi = 1 under d1. Consequently, we know that Y0 respondents
are consistent and select yi = 1. Similar logic implies that 1 − Y1 of respondents are
consistent and select yi = 0. Scaling the former by the total fraction of respondents
that are consistent yields the share of consistent respondents who select yi = 1, or pic.
Proposition 2.2 establishes that without frame monotonicity, the consistent response
share is partially identified. Borrowing terminology from Imbens and Angrist (1994), we
can divide the set of inconsistent respondents into two groups, those who are affected
by the frame in the same direction as the majority of inconsistent respondents (the
frame-compliers) and those who are affected by the frame in the opposite direction
(the frame-defiers). That is, a frame-defier selects yi = 1 if and only if the frame
is d0. Intuitively, the presence of frame-defiers means that some respondents who are
inconsistent will be misclassified as consistent in the computation of Yc; the misclassified
group will contain the frame-defiers, plus an offsetting number of frame-compliers. The
12
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frame-defiers will respond with yi = 1 if and only if they are assigned to d0; the frame-
compliers if and only if they are assigned to d1. Since there are an equal number of
frame-defiers and frame-compliers in the group of misclassified respondents, the group,
on average, answers yi = 1 half of the time under both frames. Because the misclassified
group’s behavior – in the aggregate – is the same under each frame, the group as a whole
appears to be consistent (even though, in reality, each individual member of the group
is actually inconsistent). And because the behavior of this group is attributed to the
consistent respondents, the misclassification will bias Yc upwards from pic when pic is
in fact below 0.5 and downwards when the opposite is true. Thus the failure of frame
monotonicity implies that Yc is biased away from pic towards 0.5.
The following corollary highlights an important practical implication of this result
for survey researchers. Recall that Yp denotes the pooled response share obtained from
randomly assigning half of the respondents to each frame, Yp = 12 (Y0 + Y1).
Corollary to Proposition 2.2: Relative Bias in Yc and Yp
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, |Yc−pic| ≤ |Yp−pic|, where the inequality is strict whenever
Yc 6= Yp. In addition, Yc − pic > 0 ⇐⇒ Yp − pic > 0.
Although neither Yc nor Yp will generally be equal to the consistent response share
in the absence of frame monotonicity, this corollary states that the bias in the latter
will be at least as large as the bias in the former. Moreover, the two quantities will
be biased in the same direction, suggesting that moving from Yp to Yc will always be a
conservative adjustment.
Examples
Table 1 illustrates the estimation of the consistent response share, assuming frame
monotonicity as in Proposition 2.1, for the examples described in Section I. In the first
row, for example, we compute the fraction of consistent respondents stating a belief
that the information on Iraq was accurate. In this example, 41 percent of respondents
indicated the information was accurate when this answer choice was second (d0) and
51 percent did so when this answer choice was first (d1). As such, we calculate that
P (ci = 1) = 0.41 + 1 − 0.51 = 0.90, and Yc = 0.4060.90 ≈ 0.45. In words, 90 percent of
respondents were consistent and of that group, 45 percent believed the information was
accurate. Similar calculations are provided for each of the examples.
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IV. Which Respondents are Consistent?
Thus far our focus has been on the distribution of answers to the survey question
being asked among the population of respondents. However, in some applications, the
consistency (or lack thereof) of the respondents will itself be an issue of primary interest
to the researcher. For example, a political campaign may be quite interested in likely
voters whose stated preferences between two candidates depend on the order in which
the candidates are listed, or upon which features of the candidates are made salient
in the wording of the survey question. Understanding the distribution of such voters
could help a campaign better target political messages, for example.
Without observing a single respondent under multiple frames, it is impossible to
identify precisely which individuals are consistent and which are not. Under the as-
sumption of frame monotonicity, however, researchers can identify the aggregate dis-
tribution of observable covariates of the consistent and inconsistent decision-makers.
The approach in this section is analogous to Abadie (2003), who, in a causal infer-
ence setting, shows how to identify the aggregate characteristics of the “compliers”
despite the fact that individual members of that group cannot be identified. Formally,
we suppose that individuals have observable covariates gi ∈ G. We denote the re-
sponse shares under each frame, conditional on respondents’ observable covariates, by
Y0(g) ≡ E[yi|di = d0; gi = g] and Y1(g) ≡ E[yi|di = d1; gi = g]. Finally, we will replace
our (unconditional) frame exogeneity assumption with the following conditional frame
exogeneity assumption:
Assumption 1’ (Conditional Frame Exogeneity) For each i and for all g ∈ G,
(di ⊥ (yi(d0), yi(d1)) | gi = g)
Like frame exogeneity, conditional frame exogeneity is guaranteed when respondents
are assigned to frames at random.
Proposition 3: Relating Consistency to Observable Covariates Under As-
sumptions 1’ and 3:
3.1 The distribution of g among the consistent respondents is given by P (gi = g | ci =
1) = Y0(g)+1−Y1(g)
Eg [Y0(g)+1−Y1(g)] P (gi = g).
3.2 The distribution of g among the inconsistent respondents is given by P (gi = g | ci =
0) = Y1(g)−Y0(g)
Eg [Y1(g)−Y0(g)] P (gi = g).
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Intuitively, the distribution of g among the consistent (or inconsistent) respondents can
be found by adjusting the overall distribution of g by the relative propensity of type-g
respondents to be consistent (or inconsistent), relative to the overall population. An
illustration of Proposition 3 can be found in Section VI.
V. Framing Effects When the Characteristic of Interest is De-
fined For All Respondents
In some settings, the individual characteristic of interest, y∗i , will be well-defined for
all respondents, even those whose response to the survey depends on the frame. For
example, framing effects have been documented in surveys that solicit self-reported be-
havioral frequency data, such as the frequency with which respondents watch television
or engage in risky health behaviors (see Schwarz and Oyserman (2001) for a number
of examples). When the question is about past behavior, it is clear that a “true an-
swer” exists for all individuals, even if the presence of a framing effect prevents that
answer from being revealed by the survey question. More controversially, respondents
may have a well-defined true answer even when the question being asked is about an
attitude or belief (see Fischhoff, 1991). This section provides tools for settings in which
researchers seek to identify the distribution of characteristics among the population of
respondents, including those whose responses depend on the frame.
Assumption 4 (Characteristic of Interest is Well-Defined For All Respondents)
For each i, y∗i ∈ {0, 1}.
The parameter of interest in this problem is the characteristic share in the full popula-
tion, E[y∗i ].
We begin by providing worst-case bounds for the characteristic share (in the spirit
of Manski, 1989).
Proposition 4: Partially Identifying the Distribution of the Characteristic
of Interest Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and 4 are satisfied.
4.1 Under frame monotonicity, Y0 ≤ E[y∗i ] ≤ Y1.
4.2 Without frame monotonicity, Yc ≥ 12 =⇒ E[y∗i ] ∈ [Y0 − (1 − Y1), 1] and Yc ≤
1
2 =⇒ E[y∗i ] ∈ [0, Y0 + Y1].
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Given response shares under two frames, Y0 and Y1, it might be tempting to conclude
that the characteristic share, E[y∗i ], lies somewhere between these values. Proposi-
tion 4 reveals, perhaps surprisingly, that such an interpretation is only valid when the
researcher assumes not only that the consistent responses reveal the characteristic of
interest (Assumption 2), but also assumes frame monotonicity (Assumption 3). Intu-
itively, when there are a large number of inconsistent respondents who respond against
the frame, the magnitude of the framing effect can appear much smaller than it really
is. Proposition 4.2 shows that without frame monotonicity, the response shares under
the two frames still provides some information – in the form of a one-directional bound
– about the characteristic of interest. These bounds will be more informative when Y0
and 1 − Y1 are very different, which tends to occur when the observed framing effect,
Y1 − Y0, is small and response shares are far from 0.5.
Some researchers may wish to go further, making additional assumptions to point-
identify the distribution of the characteristic of interest in the population. Under As-
sumptions 1 and 2, Proposition 2.1 identifies the distribution of the characteristic of
interest among the consistent respondents. The problem of recovering this distribution
for the full population then parallels the well-studied problem of accounting for selec-
tion into a particular survey sample. Here, the goal is to account for selection into
the population of consistent respondents (e.g., Manski, 2003). Note though that one
important difference from the standard setting is that researchers cannot directly ob-
serve whether a particular respondent is consistent, whereas one can typically observe
whether any given respondent is included in the sample.
The approach we develop below parallels the use of post-stratification weights to
address the presence of missing data. The key assumption is that conditional on observ-
able covariates, the consistent and inconsistent respondents have the same distribution
of the characteristic of interest:
Assumption 5: Conditional Consistency Independence
∀g ∈ G, cov(ci, y∗i |gi = g) = 0,
where g denotes observable covariates, as in the previous section.
Proposition 5: The Characteristic Share Under Conditional Consistency
Independence Let Yc(g) = Y0(g)Y0(g)+1−Y1(g) . Under Assumptions 1-5, E[y
∗
i ] = Eg[Yc(g)].
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To implement the approach suggested by Proposition 5, one first divides the re-
spondents by observable group g ∈ G, then calculate Yc(g) for each group. One then
obtains E[y∗i ] from a weighted sum of each Yc(g), with weights based on the distribution
of g in the full population. The technique is analogous to post-stratification weights
frequently employed in survey analysis (Holt and Smith, 1979), which correct for the
fact that some respondents are more likely to select into the sample than others. In
our setting, consistency weights correct for the fact that some respondents are more
likely to select into the consistent subgroup of the population – the subgroup whose
characteristic of interest is revealed by their responses to the survey question.
Carrying the analogy further, for conventional post-survey non-response weights to
eliminate selection bias, it must be the case that respondents’ propensity to partici-
pate in the survey is uncorrelated with unobservable correlates of the variable being
investigated. Our conditional consistency independence assumption guarantees exactly
this; it will fail when respondents’ consistency is related to the distribution of y in
unobservable ways. As such, the more individual covariates the researcher can observe
that are potentially correlated with a respondent’s consistency, the more confident the
researcher can be that using consistency weights will recover the consistency share for
the population.
VI. Illustration
In this section, we illustrate our proposed approach for dealing with survey framing
effects. The survey we focus on is the 2003 Gallup telephone poll that solicited beliefs
about the Bush administration provision of information leading up to the Iraq war,
and that was described in the first example in Section I. For ease of illustration, we
drop 31 respondents from the raw data who did not respond to the survey question as
well as 6 respondents who did not classify themselves as Democrats, Republicans, or
Independents.
A natural first step for a survey researcher concerned about a framing effect is to
investigate whether such an effect is actually present. This is plain from the responses
summarized in Table 1. When the “accurate information” answer was presented first,
51% of respondents reported believing that the Bush administration provided accurate
information (Y1 = 0.51). In contrast, when the “inaccurate information” answer was
provided first, only 41% of respondents reported believing that the information provided
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by the Bush administration was accurate (Y0 = 0.41). A simple t-test confirms the
difference in responses between the two frames is statistically significant (p = 0.016).
Having confirmed that a framing effect exists, the researcher next confronts the
question of what can be learned about the consistent respondents, those who report
having the same belief regardless of which answer choice is presented first. Proposition
2 provides the mean response of this group if the assumptions underlying the proposi-
tion are satisfied. Frame exogeneity (Assumption 1) is satisfied with this data because
the survey’s answer order was randomized across respondents. In addition, it seems
likely that consistent responses would reflect the characteristic of interest (Assumption
2), since most respondents would have lacked incentives to falsely report their beliefs
to the survey administrators (the survey was anonymous and not conducted in per-
son). Consequently, Proposition 2 tells us that how much can be learned about the
consistent respondents depends on whether frame monotonicity (Assumption 3) holds
– i.e., whether every inconsistent respondent selects whichever answer choice is listed
first. If one is willing to make this assumption, Proposition 2.1 implies that 89.8% of
respondents are consistent (standard error 4.2%), and that of that group, 45.3% (stan-
dard error 2.4%) believe that the information provided by the Bush administration was
accurate.7 Without assuming frame monotonicity, the survey data provide much less
information: applying Proposition 2.2, the fraction of consistent respondents believing
the information was accurate could be anywhere between 0 and 45.3%.
The researcher can next use Proposition 3 to investigate which types of survey-takers
are most sensitive to the framing effect. Table 2 illustrates this result, focusing on the
survey-taker’s party affiliation. For example, the share of Democrats among the incon-
sistent respondents is calculated as P (gi = DEM |ci = 0) = Y1(DEM)−Y0(DEM)Eg [Y1(g)−Y0(g)] P (gi =
DEM) =
(
0.449−0.310
0.104
)
(0.193) ≈ 0.256.8 The main substantive finding in Table 2 is that
Democrats are over-represented among the inconsistent respondents – they constitute
just 19 percent of all respondents but 26 percent of those respondents whose answers
depend on the answer order.
7The standard errors are derived using the delta method, as described in Appendix B.
8The denominator of this expression, 0.104, estimates the fraction of inconsistent respondents in the
population, E[ci]. To estimate this, we use a weighted sum over the three groups, Eg[Y1(g)−Y0(g)] =∑
g[Y1(g)−Y0(g)]P (g) and the numbers in the first three columns of Table 2. This estimator identifies
E[ci] under Assumption 1’ (Conditional Frame Exogeneity). If frames are randomly assigned, both
this expression and the one in Proposition 2 will identify E[ci]. With random assignment in finite
samples, however, it is preferable to use the estimator employed here, since doing so ensures that the
shares in 3.1 and 3.2 will sum to one.
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Table 2: Illustration of Proposition 3: Respondent Characteristics by Con-
sistency
Response
Share
under d0
Response
Share
under d1
Fraction
of All Re-
spondents
Fraction of
Consistent
Respondents
Fraction of
Inconsistent
Respondents
Y0 Y1 P (gi = g) P (gi = g | ci = 1) P (gi = g | ci = 0)
Party
Democrat 31.0 (6.1) 44.9 (7.2) 19.3 (1.7) 18.5 (1.8) 25.6 (16.8)
Republican 49.2 (4.4) 59.1 (4.2) 48.5 (2.1) 48.8 (2.3) 45.9 (20.0)
Independent 33.3 (5.4) 42.6 (4.9) 32.2 (2.0) 32.7 (2.2) 28.5 (18.6)
Total 50.9 (3.0) 40.7 (3.0) 1 1 1
Note: yi = 1 indicates respondent answered that the Bush Administration provided accurate informa-
tion about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. All quantities represent percentages. Standard errors are
provided in parentheses beside point estimates. Standard errors were obtained via the delta method,
see Appendix B. Source: Gallup Organization (2003).
Whether there is more to glean from the survey data depends on whether the re-
searcher believes that the characteristic of interest is defined for those respondents who
are subject to framing effects. In the context of this survey, there are two possibilities.
First, it may be that the survey-takers whose responses depend on the question order
simply lack any well-defined belief about whether the Bush administration provided
accurate information. In that case, the researcher should limit his or her attention to
the consistent respondents. Alternatively, it may be that at least some of the inconsis-
tent respondents do have an opinion about the survey question, notwithstanding the
fact that the answer order interfered with that opinion being expressed. In that case,
our proposed approach is for the researcher to use the information recovered about
the consistent respondents to estimate the (unobservable) opinions of the inconsistent
respondents, and thereby recover the distribution of opinions for the entire population
of survey-takers.
We have provided two approaches for proceeding when the characteristic of interest
is defined for all respondents, including those who are inconsistent. First, Proposition
4 allows one to bound the fraction of all survey-takers believing the Bush administra-
tion’s information was accurate. If one assumes frame monotonicity, Proposition 4.1
implies that this quantity is between 40.7% and 50.9% of all survey-takers. Without
frame monotonicity, Proposition 4.2 implies that we may conclude only that fraction of
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survey-takers believing the information to be accurate is below 91.6%. Without frame
monotonicity, therefore, very little can be gleaned about the distribution of survey-
takers’ beliefs from these data.
The second approach we developed allows one to obtain a precise estimate for the
distribution of opinions in the population of survey-takers, but requires imposing con-
ditional consistency indepndence (Assumption 5) in addition to our other assumptions.
In the context of our running example, this means that we must assume the opinions of
the inconsistent respondents are the same, on average, as the opinions of the consistent
respondents who share their observable characteristics. For the sake of illustration,
suppose respondents’ only observable characteristic was their party affiliation. Our ap-
proach would then be to separately estimate the distribution of opinions among the
consistent respondents of each political party and then to re-weight those estimates
based on the prevalence of each party in the overall population of survey-takers, as
illustrated in Table 3.
The results of this exercise suggest that 45.3 percent of all survey-takers believe the
information provided by the Bush administration’s was accurate. Intuitively, Democrats
are over-represented in the inconsistent group and have a lower tendency to believe
that the Bush administration information was accurate, so the fraction of inconsistent
respondents believing the information was accurate is less than the corresponding frac-
tion among consistent respondents. Note that because a relatively small fraction of all
survey-takers are inconsistent, the discrepancy between the estimates of E[y∗i | ci = 1]
and E[y∗i ] is quite small in this example.
VII. Conclusion
This paper presents a new set of empirical tools to study a ubiquitous problem in survey
research: the sensitivity of responses to seemingly arbitrary features of survey design.
As in other settings, the degree to which the parameters of interest can be identified
from the data depend on the assumptions the researcher is willing to impose.
Two limitations of our work deserve particular consideration in future research.
First, we have focused on the relatively simple setting of binary response survey ques-
tions with two frames. Analyzing settings with additional frames or answer choices
requires further assumptions. One straightforward generalization obtains when re-
sponses are sensitive to multiple binary frames, such as answer choice order and posi-
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Table 3: Illustration of Proposition 5: Consistency Weights
Democrat Republican Independent
Fraction of consistent believing
information was accurate,
E[y∗i |ci = 1, gi = g]
36.0(5.5) 54.6(3.4) 36.7(4.2)
Fraction of all respondents, P (gi = g) 19.3(1.7) 48.5(2.1) 32.2(2.0)
Fraction of inconsistent respondents,
P (gi = g|ci = 0) 25.6(16.8) 45.9(20.0) 28.5(18.6)
Fraction of population believing
information was accurate, E[y∗i ]
45.3
(2.0)
Fraction of inconsistent believing
information was accurate, E[y∗i |ci = 0]
44.8
(12.9)
Fraction of consistent believing
information was accurate, E[y∗i |ci = 1]
45.3
(2.4)
Note: All quantities represent percentages. Standard errors are provided in parentheses below point
estimates. Standard errors were obtained via the delta method, see Appendix B. Source: Gallup
Organization (2003).
tive/negative question wording. In such cases, under an appropriately modified mono-
tonicity assumption, one can focus on the two most extreme frames – the two frames
making respondents most likely to select one or the other answer – as the two frames
in the binary framework considered here. Second, our approach is aimed at eliminating
the bias induced by framing effects, but other sources of bias could still be a problem.
Generalizing the approach proposed here to non-binary survey questions and to settings
characterized by other types of bias – such as random choice, forgetfulness, or selection
effects – are important directions for future research.
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